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“Chimerica” illustrates the interactions between a Chinese model of high savings, 
overinvestment and export-led growth and the American model of leverage investment, credit 
consumption and finance-led growth. The collapse of the U.S model, linked with the 
unregulated derivatives market, drives China to redirect its growth toward domestic 
consumption, despite the strengthening of regionalisation in East Asia. The new stimulus plan, 
based on investment, is limited by both income disparities and the under-development of 
social protection. Land reform, or the collective redistribution of the remaining state assets, 
could stimulate domestic consumption. But the first solution deprives the local state of 
financial resources, and the second solution collides with the interests of the state-party system. 
However, stronger social movements could lead to a better income distribution. Like two faces 
of the same coin, credit consumption or high savings rate reflect the crisis of a global 
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1 I am grateful to Prof. Victor Rodwin, from New York University, who gave useful comments and revisions on this text.   2
The rise of China and its impact on the world economy, 
especially its relationship with the US, has played a major role in 
the present global crisis. The early years of the 21st century have 
seen the development of a close interdependence between the 
American model of finance-led growth and the Chinese model of 
export-led growth. 
 
1. Finance-led growth  
The progressive deregulation and globalisation of financial 
markets since the 1980s created an unusual situation where 
global savings were financing the credit consumption of one of 
the richest countries in the world, the USA, because of the 
supremacy of the US dollar. As the winner of the Cold war, the 
USA set the tune with its low inflation and easy money policy, 
which allowed financial operators in their quest for profit 
maximisation to create asset bubbles, i.e. the internet bubble of 
the 1998-2001, the housing bubble between 2001 and 2007, and 
the primary commodity bubble in 2007-2008, which created 
another surge of global inflationary trends. The collapse of this 
neo-capitalist model in September 2008 also signals the 
transformation of what Moritz Schularick at Berlin’s Free 
University and Niall Ferguson at Harvard University have called 
“Chimerica”, to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the 
two giants which were responsible for more than half of the 
world’s economic growth in the years 2002 to 2008. “One half 
did the saving and the other half did the spending”, as China’s 
accumulated international reserves (estimated at $2 trillion) 
served to finance the U.S current account deficit as well as 
keeping Chinese exports affordable. There are two faces of the 
same coin: from the end of 2001, which marked the access of 
China to the WTO to 2008, Americans’ personal accumulated 
debts have exceeded the sum of their debts in the previous 40 
years, US savings having declined from more than 5 percent to 
less than zero of gross national income, while Chinese savings 
rose from less than 30 percent to more than 45 percent. 
This relationship was of course not limited to these two 
countries as the rest of Asia was also export-driven, trade 
deficits and household indebtedness had also increased in 
Europe, and energy exporters were also recycling their 
petrodollars in other western countries, but as Niall Ferguson 
rightly puts it “Chimerica was the real engine of the world 
economy”.
2 Thus, as the roots of the present crisis are 
inseparable from its consequences and the mutations it may 
generate, it is useful to analyze them from a “Chimerica” 
perspective. 
First of all, we may underline that the market booms of 1998 to 
2008 were based on rational expectations. The digital revolution, 
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comparable in its impact, to the invention of printing, explains 
the Internet boom. Oil prices have risen more than five-fold 
between 2000 and 2007, as strong demand from China and India, 
accompanied by the depreciation of the US dollar pushed 
commodity exporters to raise their prices. But as Thomas Palley 
has shown, “there is a documented change in the character of oil 
trading, with speculators (i.e financial institutions and hedge 
funds) now accounting for 70 per cent of trades, up from 37 per 
cent seven years ago”
3. Thus, the accumulation of pro-cyclical 
risks, based on the easily obtainable banking credit
4, led to 
irrational expectations. In this respect, the collective culpability 
of central bankers and fiscal authorities, especially in the USA 
and Europe, is overwhelming, since they voluntarily let develop 
the highest range of financial globalisation with minimum 
national (not to mention international) regulation. Focusing on 
the prices of goods and services, they neglected the follow-ups 
of asset inflation (real-estate and stocks), and of financial 
innovations, which were supposed to reduce risk, but which were 
also “designed to circumvent regulation or taxation” 
5, and 
finally spread risk to unprecedented levels.  
The market for derivatives or credit risk transfers (CRTs), which 
has grown more than a thousand times since the beginning of the 
1980s, to insure operators against commodity prices, interest 
rates or currency exchange fluctuations, was extended to credit 
default swaps (CDSs). A credit default swap is a contract under 
which the seller, for a fee, agrees to make a payment to the 
protection buyer if the referenced security, usually some kind of 
bond, experiences various “credit events”, such as bond issuer 
bankruptcy, default or reorganisation. In 2000, President Clinton 
signed the Commodities Futures Modernisation Act exempting 
certain derivative transactions on commodities and swap 
agreements, including CDSs, from regulation. As CDSs were not 
subject to state laws or control, the way was cleared for the 
growth of a market where deals were privately made between two 
parties, without standards for the solvency of the parties. “The 
buyer does not know how much risk the seller is taking on. And 
there are no requirements for the seller to hold reserves of 
capital against the risks it is taking on selling swaps.”
6 CDSs were 
massively used to insure against mortgage default risks and 
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created the illusion of a low-risk environment  accepted by the 
regulators of the Federal Reserve.
7 
This unregulated market, whose notional value stood at $54.6 
trillion at midyear 2008, was a principal cause of the near 
collapse of the U.S financial system, as CDSs played a major role 
in AIG’s, Bear Stearns’ and Lehman’s financial problems. 
Lehman Bros. was one of the largest over the counter (OTC) 
derivative dealers.  AIG Financial Products, a subsidiary of AIG, 
active in the derivative market, did not routinely hold reserves of 
capital, or collateral for the risks it was taking. It issued 
transactions covering more than $440 billion in bonds with 
obligations that it could not cover. The head of AIG Financial 
Products, M. Joseph Cassano, apparently made $280 million in 
the eight years up to 2008, and after leaving the company, in 
February 2008, got a consultancy contract with AIG for $1 
million a month.
8 The Bank of International Settlements, noted 
as early as 2002, that this market had given rise to a 
concentration of risk in financial operators less capitalised and 
less governed by regulation
9, such as the hedge funds, two-thirds 
of which are located in offshore locations, with a predilection 
for the Cayman Islands, but which are mostly funded  (86 per 
cent) in the US 
10.  
Hedge funds, with their progressive institutionalisation after 
2000, have played a key role in financial innovation and risk-
transfer techniques, especially securitisation, which is at the 
origin of the sub-prime crisis. They were responsible for 58 per 
cent of the US credit derivatives market by volume and 45 per 
cent of its emerging markets bonds in 2005. They represented 40 
per cent and 50 per cent respectively of the New York stock 
exchange and London stock exchange transactions on the eve of 
the 2008 crisis. Apart from hedge funds, the new surge of private 
equity funds, “ranging from start-up venture finance to leverage 
buyouts to vulture or distressed asset funds”, according to the 
IMF, increased the use of risk-taking and leverage to 
unprecedented levels, with concrete implications for the 
operation of restructured or acquired firms. Cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions by private-equity firms and hedge funds 
reached more than $100 billion per annum after 2003, and 
represented more than a quarter, on average, of global foreign 
direct investment flows, between 2003 and 2007 
11. The Carlyle 
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Capital Corporation, a subsidiary of the US based Carlyle Group, 
particularly active in the Defence industry contracts in Iraq, was 
leveraged up to 32 times, or 1 dollar of capital for 32 dollars of 
liabilities before adverse market developments led to its 
liquidation in march 2008, with a $16 billion debt.
12 
Far from effective supervision, the growing impact of offshore 
financial centres in all continents, which represented half of the 
activity of international banks and a third of the total of outward 
foreign direct investments, have also strong fiscal implications, 
since they cost $350 billion, 10 per cent of the fiscal receipts in 
the US, and would represent from 1.7 to 3 per cent of GDP in 
France, or the equivalent of the annual fiscal deficit
13. As wealthy 
individuals in the developing world evade more than $100 billion 
worth of taxes in their home countries each year
14, these fiscal 
issues are a perfect reflection of the current political order. 
The crisis which extended to the whole world with the fall of the 
Lehman Brothers investment bank, in September 2008, prompted 
exceptional bail-out plans in the US and Europe. Rising deficits 
mobilised governments in the US and Europe to support banks 
and insurance companies. This assistance which may represent 12 
per cent of GDP in the US and 8 per cent in United Kingdom for 
2009, raises again the question of this fiscal evasion which has 
become systemic, creating a kind of “illegal legality”, and 
exacerbating the speculative tendencies responsible for the local 
and regional financial crises since the end of the Cold war 
15. As 
Jeffrey Sachs underlined, “the boom in housing and stock market 
prices increased U.S households net wealth by around $18 trillion 
during 1996-2006. The rise in consumption based on this 
wealth”, which fed  global growth, notably in China, “in turn 
raised house prices further, convincing households and lenders 
to ratchet up the bubble another notch”.
16 
Jacques Sapir has clearly shown that the gains of growth due to 
the “wealth effect” of the mortgage credit (under the form of the 
Home Equity Extraction) explains the growth performance of the 
US economy between 2002 and 2007. Without the Home Equity 
Extraction contribution, US growth would have been comparable 
to the Eurozone and even less important.
17 
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In short, the American model of finance-led growth had 
succeeded in resolving by way of deregulation and mathematical 
formulations one of the issues which dominated the last ten 
years after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998: how to give to the one 
percent richest people, particularly active in the financial sphere, 
rent-seeking incomes comparable to the beginning of the 20
th 
century, while lending to the poor and letting them realise their 
dream of security by buying their homes.  Finance-led growth, 
built on an easy availability of credit, led to a high concentration 
of wealth and income gains in the hands of a few: 40 per cent of 
American corporate profits in 2006 went to the financial sector, 
while the share of income going to the top 1 per cent of the 
population doubled
18. Behind all the magic of this financial 
alchemy, the “shadow banking system” created according to 
Nouriel Roubini “a housing bubble, a mortgage bubble, an equity 
bubble, a bond bubble, a credit bubble, a commodity bubble, a 
private equity bubble, and a hedge fund bubble, which are all 
now bursting simultaneously.”
19 
Whatever the political consequences of this systemic crisis, 
which will certainly come with the socialisation of losses by the 
public authorities, it is clear that it will redesign the post Cold 
war geo-economic balance, perhaps in favour of Europe, but 
certainly in favour of East Asia, mainly China. Despite the 
likelihood of a lasting recession in Britain, Ireland and Spain, 
due to the size of their housing recessions, the State’s 
redistributive tradition in Europe, which was being more and 
more discredited in Brussels as it is on the other side of the 
Atlantic, as the main symptom of euro-sclerosis, is better suited 
to face the current economic crisis. Moreover, the existence of 
the euro, in a zone whose intra-regional trade represents 31 per 
cent of global trade, and whose interregional trade, mainly 
directed toward Asia and North America, represents another 20 
per cent of global trade, will certainly raise its global status as a 
reserve currency, despite the lack of political integration in 
Europe.  Official reserves held in Euro are 27 per cent of 2008 
world total, up from 18 per cent a decade ago, while the US 
dollar share has fallen to 63 per cent from 71 per cent in the 
same period.
20 
                                                                                                                            
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) estimate that homeowners extracted $747 billion in 
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2. Versus export-led growth 
But the rise of the economic power of East Asia, and especially 
China, will be the main consequence of this global crisis for a 
few reasons.  First of all, China, with 6 per cent of the global 
GDP, and Japan, with 10 per cent, are two of the four large 
economies having huge export surpluses, along with Germany 
and Saudi Arabia. China and Japan are in a position to lend to 
other countries, to demand a bigger share of decision-making in 
international organisations such as the IMF, or to create their 
own Asian Monetary Fund, with an 80 billion US dollars reserve, 
as the idea, first launched during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, 
has been revived during the fall of 2008. They are also in a 
position to diversify their portfolio with the fall of commodity 
and asset prices, which is offering new business opportunities in 
strategic sectors corresponding to their long-term priorities such 
as energy, minerals, transport, environment and health.  
China has bypassed Japan for the first time to become the largest 
holder of US Treasury securities, with $652 billion in October 
2008, compared with Japan’s  $573bn dollars. China’s State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and commercial 
banks held $370bn in debt issued by then struggling US mortgage 
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
21. With the decrease of 
interest rates, it will be less profitable or even loss making for 
China, to invest in US treasury bonds, given the gap between 
their low-yield and the 20 percent appreciation of the Renminbi 
to the US dollar since 2005.  But it will be more lucrative to buy 
back the Chinese enterprises’ shares held by the US, and to 
diversify its business portfolio. China Investment Corp, the 
sovereign wealth fund, has incurred large unrealized losses, of 
the order of several billion US dollars, on its stakes in US private 
equity firms Blackstone Group and Wall Street Bank, Morgan 
Stanley. It does not intend to take the steps of Japanese banks 
and securities firms, which are acquiring stakes in beleaguered 
US financial institutions. But firms such as KBC, AIG and HSBC 
Holdings are competing with 30 other financial institutions for a 
share of China’s $263 billion asset management industry. More 
and more countries such as Canada, which owns important oil 
reserves, welcome Chinese investments
22.  However, the securing 
of adequate returns on the $ 2 trillion of foreign currency 
reserves has become a daunting task for China as the USA has 
become its main banker, and there are plans for the Yuan to join 
other international currencies to be used for foreign exchange 
reserves. The Chinese government has decided to allow in the 
next two years the Renminbi to be used for settlements with 
Hongkong and Macao, and has signed settlement agreements with 
Russia, Mongolia, and other ASEAN countries, to use the 
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Renminbi in bilateral trade. This progressive regional 
convertibility is the first step to realize the full convertibility of 
the currency, in order to counterbalance the likely depreciation 
of the US dollar in the coming years, which would be the more 
convenient way for the US government to decrease its foreign 
debt.
23 
Secondly, they are signs that the economic integration of East 
Asia, which was mainly designed to increase the export 
competitiveness of the region, may turn out to be more self-
centred, and thus stronger, as in the case of Europe. The 
economic regionalisation of East Asia was the unexpected result 
of the G 7 Plaza Agreement, in 1985, whereby the forced 
revaluation of the yen, and then the Korean won and the Taiwan 
dollar, was seen as a appropriate monetary response to the trade 
surpluses of these countries vis-à-vis the US and European 
markets. Facing strong export competitiveness falls, Japan and 
the four dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) delocalised massively towards Southeast Asia and 
China, which were then opening up, the manufacturing of their 
labour-intensive and low-added value products (toys, clothing 
and consumer electronics), while moving into capital-intensive 
and higher added-value sectors (automobile, ICTs, finance etc.).  
This process accelerated after 1994, with the de-facto fixed 
exchange rate of the Renminbi to the US dollar, and the strong 
non-inflationary growth of China, which attracted MNCs. China 
became not only the axis of the intra-Asian division of labour, 
but also the world’s factory, producing practically everything, 
except big aircraft. It survived the Asian crisis, which 
destabilised for a certain period of time Southeast Asia, by 
adjusting its internal economy through cost cutting, the transfer 
of State social welfare to households, and by launching a huge 
program of highway construction, which now covers the entire 
nation.  
With its accession to the WTO in 2001, a quarter of China’s 
growth was generated by exports and investments linked to 
exports. But this proportion, based on national figures, is much 
more important, if we take into account the concentration of 
most of foreign direct investment and exports in the high growth 
and relatively rich coastal regions, and its effects on  the 
construction industry, services, and on inland regions, through 
commodities demand, outsourcing in small and medium firms, 
employment and labour migration. If we add that underground 
lending, mainly based in coastal regions, is equivalent to almost a 
third of the loans extended through the banking system
24, we may 
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reasonably estimate that during the early years of the 2000s at 
least 40 percent of China’s growth was directly or indirectly 
dependent on external demand. 
From 2001 to 2007, Chinese exports, growing at an 
unprecedented yearly average of 28 per cent, more than 
quadrupled while its imports more than tripled. About 45 per 
cent of its trade receipts came from Asia in 2007, while Europe 
and North America each received 21 per cent of China’s exports. 
This dynamic of regional integration is even stronger in the case 
of Japan. More than half of its exports and nearly half of its 
imports are made with Asian countries, and China became its 
main supplier in the early 2000s, with more than 20 per cent of 
its market share.
25 So, despite an expected sharp decline of 
Chinese exports to Europe, North America, and to the new 
emerging markets of commodity exporters that it gained in the 
early 2000s, such as South America ($39 billion of exports in 
2007), Africa ($37 billion), the Middle East ($44 billion) or the 
CIS ($48 billion), which are suffering from the fall of commodity 
prices, China has the scope to keep or develop its export status 
of low-cost products in Asia, especially in Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand and India, and to appear more and 
more as an importer’s market for equipment, transport goods and 
other technology intensive products from the US and Europe. 
Since the globalisation of the crisis in September 2008, China has 
renewed and strengthened relations with the heavyweights of the 
Asian region, such as Japan, and South Korea, and to address 
liquidity problems in South Korea, which has seen its currency 
plunge, as foreign investors have fled from the country’s 
financial markets amid the worldwide credit crunch
26. Following 
an agreement between the three central banks, Seoul can obtain a 
combined $46 billion from Tokyo and Beijing in case of 
necessity. An Asian monetary fund with an $80 billion reserve 
available to fight a regional financial crisis is de facto taking 
shape. What is more, China has taken decisive steps towards 
Taiwan, with the historic agreement of November 2008, 
expanding cross-straits air services to more than 20 Chinese 
towns, allowing direct shipping and postal links, as well as 
setting-up a reporting mechanism on food safety, to enforce its 
quality control after the melamine scandal. This agreement 
represents a “giant step in cross-strait relations” according to 
Taiwanese business leaders who are eager to enhance financial 
cooperation with China and to set-up a mutual mechanism to 
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manage the strong foreign exchange reserves of the mainland, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. On the trade field, there is an ample 
range for further cooperation between the two complementary 
economies, since 40 per cent of Taiwan exports are shipped to 
China, especially under the form of processing trade for the 
ICTs, while China represents only 12 per cent of Taiwan 
imports.  Two-way trade was $130 billion in 2007, although the 
traders had to go through a third territory, usually Hong Kong. 
The same restrictions were limiting Taiwanese investment in the 
mainland until the new President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou lifted 
most of these restrictions during the summer of 2008. Around 80 
per cent of Taiwan’s FDI is directed to China, especially in the 
ICT sector (computers, telecom and audio-video equipment), 
which has become the driving force of Chinese exports in the 
early 2000s. Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese companies have 
pumped at least $100 billion in China, about a fifth of the 
realized FDI stock. Four hundred thousand Taiwanese are 
officially working in China, mainly in the Shanghai (Kunshan 
district), Fujian and Guangdong regions, but most observers 
estimate they may be at least twice that number. In 2008, 
Taiwan-based large banks and stocks and securities firms have 
opened representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Kunshan and 
Shenzhen and hope to engage quickly in meaningful business 
opportunities “to overcome the negative effects of the ongoing 
financial tumult, which is not going to end anytime soon.”
27 
In short, the general concentration on China of Taiwanese 
businesses, eager to overcome the reduction in their export 
markets, may lead to the emergence of a real common market of 
Greater China (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan), which will have 
tremendous consequences on the global economic order, as well 
as delicate consequences on China’s internal political system, 
which has always been based on a monopolistic approach. 
 
3. China and the global crisis  
This does not mean that China will not suffer from the global 
crisis. First of all, the general climate of increased living 
standards, similar to the one prevailing on the other side of the 
Pacific, began to deteriorate in October 2007, two months after 
the subprime crisis, with the continuous fall of the Chinese stock 
market, by almost two third in the following year. This has 
reduced the savings of the 60 million of the middle class 
shareholders, who tended to favour investments funds and stocks 
instead of low-yield bank deposits in an inflationary context. 
And the real estate boom, which represented around 15 per cent 
of overall investment and an important part of local authorities 
revenues, began to decline, after exceptional gains in 2007. This 
weakness in the building industry in turn caused a slowdown in 
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upstream industries and services, such as steel, cement, 
electricity, and freight.
28  
Secondly, falling demand for exports, higher material costs, 
stricter labour laws adopted in 2008, and a strong appreciation of 
23 per cent of the Renminbi to the Euro between July and 
October 2008 have combined to reduce China’s growth in the 
last quarter of 2008. The greatest impact was on the labour-
intensive, small and medium sized export-oriented enterprises, 
situated in the coastal areas, and vulnerable to market changes. 
These are major employers, absorbing 70 per cent of the 20 
million new jobs every year.
29 In the first half of 2008, 67,000 
such companies, each with an annual turnover exceeding 5 
million Yuan ($735,000) closed and laid off more than 20 million 
employees, according to the National Development and Reform 
Commission
30. Two-thirds of the toy exporters, mainly small-
sized businesses situated in Guangdong province, shut down in 
the first nine months of 2008, according to Chinese customs 
officials. And this is just a beginning, since the Federation of 
Hong Kong Industries has warned that a quarter of the 70,000 
Hong Kong owned firms in Southern China, which employ 10 
million people, may go bust by February 2009. The flows of 
migrant workers from inland provinces to coastal areas, is 
reversing. Statistics from the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security showed 10 million of China’s total 130 million 
migrant workers went back jobless to their rural place of origin 
in 2008
31. 
But these developments, which have strong social implications in 
terms of employment, concern labour-intensive exports and low 
added-value industries, mainly based in Guangdong or in other 
coastal provinces (toys, shoes, clothing, textiles, accessories, 
furniture etc.) which were already migrating to Cambodia, 
Vietnam or Bangladesh in search of lower wages. Things are less 
dramatic for the higher added-value sectors, such as machinery, 
equipment and ITC, which have been slowing with the reduction 
of external demand since the mid 2008. As during the Asian 
crisis of 1997-1998, national authorities will openly use this 
opportunity to restructure the economy, this time in favour of 
higher added value and technology intensive sectors, and to 
organise the return of migrant workers to their original 
provinces in order to participate in the development of the 
poorest regions. 
32 
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29  Xinhua, Beijing, 1/11/08. 
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4. From export-led growth to domestic consumption-led 
growth? (Or “where have all the savings gone?”) 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Chinese leadership 
at last realised that it could no longer rely on exports as the 
engine of economic growth, and that it was urgently needed, and 
not only at the level of rhetoric, to boost domestic demand. This 
necessity, underlined long ago, became more pressing as the 
export led growth strategy was undermining the balance of 
Chimerica, and more recently Sino-European trade
33. As half of 
this trade is linked to FDI and outsourcing by foreign 
corporations in the quest for low labour costs, Chinese export 
competitiveness has long been based on the capacity to discipline 
its workers, especially migrants, by prohibiting workers unions, 
and violating routinely the international agreements on civil 
rights it has agreed to under the UN. As the US and the 
European businesses, not to speak of the developed Asian ones, 
were largely benefiting from this situation, the USA and Europe 
never really raised this issue, which could have had strong 
repercussions on a more equal income distribution in China. 
They preferred to focus on the question of exchange rates, and 
accused China of  “monetary dumping”, which was just the result 
of severe restrictions on workers salaries and workers rights. As 
Thomas Palley has underlined, “unions have historically been 
especially important since they engage in decentralized wage 
bargaining that tie wages to firms’ productivity”, they are in a 
position to “expand markets in developing countries, which 
means tackling income inequality and getting income into the 
rights hands.”
34 
   The  Chinese  leadership  has  chosen rural policy as the main 
leverage of domestic demand. Rural consumption represents 
about a third of total consumption, although 60 percent of the 
population still live in the countryside. On October 12, 2008, on 
the thirtieth anniversary of the historic plenum, which launched 
Chinese reform in 1978, the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee adopted a new reform extending farmers’ leases on 
land from the current 30-year term to an open-ended one, and 
protecting land-use rights, including the right of land transfer. 
As land works as a rural safety-net for 250 million farm 
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households, this new policy, which may allow farmers to use 
their land as collateral to access credit, or to rent it when they 
migrate, may develop rural incomes, narrow the gap between the 
rural and the urban sector, stimulate urbanisation on a sound 
basis, and raise productivity growth. In recent years, much 
farmland had been abandoned or under-cultivated as 130 million 
migrants flocked to the cities to work in factories or 
construction sites. A report from Qinghua University revealed 
that at least 120 million farmers needed loans but only 60 per 
cent of them were able to obtain financing.
35 The recent injection 
of 130 billion Yuan ($19 billion) in the Agricultural Bank of 
China, China’s third largest Bank, enables it to sell shares to 
strategic investors and the general public, with the aim of 
developing an effective agricultural lending network, through its 
24,000 outlets nationwide.
36 
The new rural land reform was launched as early as 2006 by a 
four-year joint project of the United Nations Development 
Program and the Chinese government, covering eight pilot 
provinces
37. Throughout Chinese history, land has always been a 
strategic resource, as it was the main factor of production in a 
densely populated territory. Today the economic potential of the 
transfer of land use is considerable, as land assets value are 
greater than industrial assets: 119,000 state-owned enterprises 
have a book value of around $ 4 trillion while state-owned land 
is valued at more than $ 7 trillion
38. Official statistics show that  
revenue from the transfer of land amounted in 2005 to 550.5 
billion Yuan ($68.8 billion), accounting for one third of the 
revenue of local governments, and 3 per cent of GDP. But as 
“two thirds of land is transferred far from public scrutiny” 
39, the 
potential value of such deals may be at least twice that number 
($137 billion) or 6 per cent of GDP, a figure that may be 
compared to the share of agriculture in GDP at the same time, 
around 15 per cent. 
Thus the importance of land requisition or of this grey market, 
which has developed in a context of quick urbanisation, is 
considerable in terms of resource transfer and rent seeking. They 
are the source of the millions of complaints and the hundreds of 
violent incidents, which have erupted in the period 2000 to 2008 
around land requisition and housing demolition and resettlement, 
and were the top source of social conflict in China, opposing 
land grabbers (real estate developers) in collusion with local 
government officials in opposition to peasants or local residents. 
Official figures show that more than 40 million farmers had their 
farmland partially or wholly used for non-farming purposes, 
while only six million of them, who became landless in land 
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requisitions, have been covered by the basic living or old age 
security programmes
40. Other estimates are much higher: between 
80 and 100 million of rural residents, out of a total of 730 
million, are landless or do not have access to enough land for 
subsistence
41. The real estate boom and land rush in a context of 
quick urbanisation, contributed significantly to social 
polarisation, as 10 per cent of the richest Chinese families now 
own more than 40 per cent of total wealth, while the poorest 10 
per cent share less than 2 per cent.
42 According to the newspaper 
columnist Yao Zhongqiu, “land acquisition, infrastructure and 
real estate development contribute profits as well as astonishing 
economic growth, to bolster the political career of officials. A 
government’s social responsibilities are relegated to a minor 
place when compared to making profit.”
43 
The economic potential of the transfer of land use which may 
raise peasants’ income and productivity through a better 
allocation of land, largely depends on the local authorities, 
which, in the absence of any independent judiciary system, are 
responsible for implementing laws and policies, fixing the value 
of land, and providing appropriate documentation ensuring the 
rights of peasants on a piece of land. That is apparently the case 
for only half of the peasants
44. And the paradox of this policy of 
non-compliance is that it will deprive the local governments of a 
part of their land revenues, which represents at least a third of 
their income, not to mention the hidden commissions they used 
to receive for commercial development.
45 
The same logic applies to the stimulus plan, which has been 
announced with great fanfare before the November 2008 G 20 
summit in Washington. On this four trillion Yuan two years plan 
($585.76 billion), 45 per cent will go on the construction of 
17,000 km of new railways lines, and to new highways, airports 
and power grids, 25 per cent will go to reconstruction following 
the snowstorms and the Sichuan earthquake of 2008, 10 per cent 
has been earmarked for rural development and infrastructure, 
while the environment and housing will amount to roughly 7 to 8 
per cent each. The remaining 5 per cent includes spending on 
health, education and innovation. This stimulus package is 
expected to improve the infrastructure of the country and to 
create employment, especially for railway construction, and may 
create 6 million new jobs
46.  However, most beneficiaries of the 
infrastructure spending are state-owned enterprises rather than 
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41 Wall Street Journal, 2/12/2008. 
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small and medium sized enterprises that contribute to the biggest 
share of industrial output and more than 70 per cent of jobs
47. 
The progressive acceptance of the informal banking market, 
which has been tried-out in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, may help these 
labour-intensive companies, if the authorities carefully control 
the liabilities of these financial actors and the interest they can 
charge
48. As for the stimulus spending, the central government 
will apparently just provide less than 30 per cent of it (1.180 
trillion Yuan or $173 billion), while local governments and state 
companies will supply the rest. Provincial authorities have begun 
to compete to get a share of the pie by drawing-up investment 
plans that total 10 trillion Yuan ($1.5 trillion), the largest being 
that of  Yunnan province which has drawn-up an annual 
investment plan of 600 billion Yuan over the next five years, 
more than its actual GDP! Behind such unrealistic expectations, 
there are open worries about corruption that may develop with 
the stimulus package, and ritual calls for strict control of local 
cadres, who were responsible for large-scale mass incidents in 
2008.
49 
This plan, is forecasted to contribute over 4 percentage points to 
GDP growth in 2009, and about 1.5 percentage points more than 
in 2007
50. Other measures such as the increase in tax rebates for 
labour-intensive exports, or the successive large cuts in the 
interest-rates and reserve requirement ratios by the Peoples Bank 
of China, will improve the growth record in 2009 and 2010, but 
they do not provide an answer to the structural problems of the 
Chinese economy. While the central as well as local authorities 
are focused on strong investment to create economic growth and 
social mobility in the context of urbanisation and expansion of 
export markets, household consumption has continued to fall to 
a low level of 35.3 per cent of GDP in 2007. This low propensity 
to spend can be viewed in conjunction with the high savings rate, 
which represents 25 per cent of disposable income and 45 per 
cent of GDP, and which feeds the trend for overinvestment 
through the state banking system. The restructuring of the state 
sector in the 1990s under Zhu Rongji, has led to the progressive 
transfer of health, education, welfare, pensions and housing 
costs to the urban households, whose motivation to save has 
become precautionary in nature i.e. for retirement, illness, 
education of children, and unemployment. Health expenses are 
the highest of these costs.  
Hu Angang, an economist from Qinghua University, has 
estimated the extent of what he calls  “health poverty”. Between 
1995 and 2005, the number of people suffering from illness 
increased by 16.5 per cent, while those without social medical 
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insurance coverage rose from 900 million to one billion, which is 
more than 80 per cent of the population
51. In 2004, a think-tank 
of China’s Ministry of Health established that AIDS and 
Hepatitis B Infection caused by unsafe injections had caused 
390,000 premature deaths and 6.89 million Disability Adjustment 
Life Year Losses. Statistics showed that 30 per cent of immune 
injections and 50 per cent of therapeutic ones were unsafe, and 
in western rural areas, more than 70 per cent of disposable 
syringes for single use were reused
52. Of China’s total medical 
fees, the government’s input only accounted for 15 per cent and 
patients paid 60 per cent in 2005. As hospital treatment is too 
expensive for Chinese citizens and only about half of the urban 
population is covered by basic health insurance, the other half 
choose not to go to hospital when ill, and about a third give up 
hospitalisation because of expensive medical fees.
53 The medical 
coverage network has progressed since with a medicare system 
covering more than 91 per cent of China’s rural families who 
have joined the new rural cooperatives. 
54  Yet 11.8 per cent of 
household expenditure goes to health care, while 8 per cent of 
urban household expenditure goes to education.
55  
As lower income people have a higher propensity to consume 
than to save, any policy aiming to increase domestic demand 
should relieve health care and education costs which decrease 
private consumption, not only for the masses of peasants but 
also for urban dwellers. But despite recent efforts in these fields, 
these expenses are only a small part of the stimulus plan.  Health 
care, social security, and unemployment welfare programmes 
were just about 15 per cent of the 2007 budget and 2.4 per cent 
of GDP, far below the percentage of other developing nations. 
56 
Besides, the situation varies greatly as more than 90 per cent of 
these public expenses are managed by local authorities
57. In 
reality, boosting domestic demand requires more than investment 
plans, as overinvestment has been a recurrent trend of China’s 
economy in the 2000s. Otherwise, China may face the situation 
of post-bubble Japan in the 1990s, when ten years of public 
spending in infrastructure created a “liquidity trap”, unable to 
boost private demand. The widening income gap is responsible 
for the low domestic consumption rate, as most of the savings 
are concentrated in the hands of the urban middle class and the 
few hundred thousands millionaires, who will certainly benefit 
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from the recent opening of a subsidiary of the Bank of China in 
Geneva, specialising in non-resident Chinese wealth 
management.
58 Thus, any realistic plan should address the 
question of income redistribution, not only by way of public 
goods such as health and education, but a bold, immediate 
initiative, which would be able to electrify the population, and to 
reverse the adverse current situation.  
Chen Zhiwu, from the Yale School of Management, suggests 
distributing the remaining state assets equally to China’s 1,3 
billion citizens, by putting these assets into national wealth 
funds and distributing the fund’s share to citizens at no cost, and 
to open the state budgeting process through public hearings in 
the national legislature and public participation via the media, in 
order to reorient public spending towards people’s needs. 
59 This 
would certainly be the best plan to boost domestic demand, when 
one considers the institutional difficulties of  land reform, but it 
would be a far cry from the dynamic of “transition”, which has 
been until now characterized by the conversion of the power of 
decision of the nomenklatura into a power of appropriation of 
public assets, in industry, commerce and land.  One of the main 
ex advisers of former party chief Zhao Ziyang, and former 
premier Zhu Rongji, the economist Wu Jinglian, popularly known 
as “Mr Market”, has recently underlined these institutional 
difficulties. As corruption has infected crucial party organs 
including the police and the judiciary, “if the mainland is to 
become fully modernised”, he declared, “it must introduce three 
principles: democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law”.
60 
That is word for word what the young Wei Jingsheng, who was 
sentenced to 14 years in prison, wrote in 1979 on the Beijing 
democracy wall, in his famous wall poster “the fifth 
modernisation: democracy”. 
Whatever the future of Chen Zhiwu’s proposition, it is certain 
that the stimulus plan, based on investment, will not be able to 
contain the dramatic reversal of the flows which have funded 
China’s growth since the end of the Asian crisis ten years ago, 
and which are not only translated by the return of migrant 
workers to the countryside.  
Anyway, if the government sticks to its proposal and neglects the 
importance of social safety, people, especially lower income 
earners will react negatively and are already reacting. They are 
numerous signs that China is now entering a new phase, which 
has already been passed through by Taiwan and South Korea 
after 1986, with the revaluation of their currency, and the end of 
their old fears and anti-communist martial laws, a phase of 
strong labour unrest in favour of a better income distribution. In 
Qingdao for instance, the main port of Shandong, which is the 
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largest economic province in terms of GDP, after Guangdong, 
they were more than 7800 cases of labour disputes in 2008, up 
140 per cent from 2007. Half of these dispute cases were about 
wages, and a third involved social insurance and welfare
61. Unlike 
in 1989, this unrest will not be limited to the towns, as in the 
case of the September and October 2008 strikes of cab drivers in 
eleven cities to cut the monthly fee they pay to their employers 
and limit the number of licences issued. In October 2008, the 
CCP Central committee decided to enrol for regular training the 
weakest-link of party management, the 2000 county-level party 
secretaries. The weeklong programme was widely interpreted as 
one of the latest moves to improve the performance of local 
officials, who “were extensively taught on how to deal with mass 
incidents such as protests and strikes”.
62 
In such circumstances, it is unrealistic  to wait for China to 
become a source of the world’s “growth”. Chimerica is not going 
to collapse, as China needs to recycle its huge foreign exchange 
reserves and to make its exports to the U.S affordable by buying 
US Treasury bonds. But Chinese officials, who have an asset 
portfolio estimated at $1,100 billion in the US, are rightly 
worried about the sustainability of these assets. The American 
model of finance-led growth nearly collapsed along with the 
shadow banking  system, and its rescue added a soaring public 
deficit to the private debt, some $7,800 billion of loans, 
investments and guarantees, compared to a pre-crisis Federal 
debt of around $10,000 billion. As Niall Ferguson has 
underlined, the Treasury may have to issue $2,200 billion new 
debt in 2009, and it is not surprising that the cost of insuring 




5. The two faces of the same coin 
The problem is not reducible to an adjustment between American 
“overconsumption” and Chinese “oversaving”, which will take 
years to take shape
64.  As noted in 2005 by The Economist, the 
entry of China’s vast army of cheap labour in the global system 
of production and trade has modified the relative prices of 
labour, capital, goods and assets. It has increased the worldwide 
return on capital: in 2004, America’s corporate after tax profits 
rose to their highest level as a proportion of GDP in 75 years, 
while the shares of profit in Japan and the Eurozone were close 
to their highest for 25 years. It has reduced the price of many 
consumer goods, but also the bargaining power of workers in 
developed economies, by the threat of offshore production. In 
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this sense, the East Asian economies and China have exported 
wage deflation (the disconnection between growth, wages and 
productivity), which was largely responsible for households 
running into debt
65. And China has also held down interest rates 
in rich economies, by recycling its foreign exchange reserves in 
Treasury bonds, indirectly creating a global liquidity bubble, 
which did not translate into goods inflation (thanks to its cheap 
products) but into asset inflation (real estate and stocks).
66 
Thus credit consumption in the West, largely reflects the long-
term fall of wages in the sharing of profits, as well as widening 
income disparities. In the U.S particularly, asset inflation (real 
estate and stocks) combined with the privatization of what is still 
known as public goods in most of the Eurozone, i.e. health and 
education. Health insurance costs and education fees inflation 
accelerated the decline of savings and the demand for credit
67. 
Average household debt rose from 75 per cent of annual 
disposable income in 1990 to nearly 130 per cent in 2008. 
It is striking to see how this picture looks similar to what we 
h a v e  o b s e r v e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  China, where savings, and not 
credit, in the hands of the urban middle class, mainly finance the 
rectification of the failure of public goods supply, such as health 
and education, which have been largely privatised. But apart 
from the obvious developmental levels of the two countries, 
there is a difference in the process of accumulation, which may 
influence future economic policies. In the USA as well as in the 
Eurozone, the big winners of the last thirty years have been a 
small financial and entrepreneurial oligarchy, which, with the 
help of the political elite, have accumulated incomes completely 
disproportionate to their productivity levels, in their quest for 
capital profit maximization. Whereas in China, the dynamics of 
accumulation have been largely under control of the party-state 
oligarchy, under the form of a decentralised state capitalism. 
Chen Zhiwu has calculated that from 1995 to 2007, “inflation-
adjusted government fiscal revenue increased 5.7 times. In 
contrast, over the same period, the cumulative increase was 1.6 
times for urban residents’ per capita disposable income and 1.2 
times for rural peasants per capita income”. So, China’s 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is an economy where an 
increasing share of national income goes to the state
68. Here 
again, the disconnection between growth, wages and the level of 
wealth redistribution is responsible for under consumption, and 
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overinvestment, as the savings are massively reallocated through 
the state banking system. 
Finally, the macro-economic imbalances on the two sides of the 
Pacific, which are translated by oversaving and overinvestment in 
the case of China, and credit consumption and leverage 
investment in the case of the US, are two faces of the same coin. 
They reflect the crisis of an accumulation model tailored for a 
financial, entrepreneurial or party-state oligarchy, which created 
an unsustainable model of “growth with inequity”. The remedies 
adopted up to now in the west, which tended to add excessive 
leverage in the public sector to excessive leverage in the private 
sector
69, may have controlled the fire, but not the embers, which 
may inflame again if the structural question of wage deflation 
and the sharing of profits, which has strong social and fiscal 
implications, is not addressed. Chimerica has been basically built 
on an international division of labour and capital that is no 
longer sustainable. On one side, the finance-led growth model 
has been built on the monetary supremacy of the US $, which has 
created an addiction to debt, in order to sustain a consumerist 
mode of living. On the other side, the export-led growth model 
has pushed the gigantic capacities of production,
70 invested by 
developed Asian and the MNCs in China, to flood the world. In 
this sense, the vessel of Chimerica may be heading towards 
twilight, but certainly not, its twilight, as these capacities of 
production will remain, and China, whatever its political and 
social tribulations, will climb up the ladder of technology to 
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